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Ownership in Russia
Abstract
The broad strokes of Russian media ownership policy are relatively easy to identify: a commitment, expressed
in statutory form, to mass media pluralism, marked by both state and private ownership. Beyond that however,
the lines become blurred, as policy formulation becomes subject to competing demands. State domination
and control gives way, but not without complex relationships to the past. In this chapter, we examine the
process of change by attempting to identify the key elements of this hybrid system, focusing on several aspects
of transformation, each of which, in some way, is connected to ownership. We shall first place these matters in
historical context, and then describe the framework within which key decisions are made: the sources of law
and policy.
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CHAPTER TEN
Russia
By PeterKmg and Monroe E. 'Price
THE BROAD strokes of Russian media own,~ship policy are .. relatively easy to identify: a commitment, expressed in". statutory form, to mass media pluralism, marked by bothstate and private ownership. Beyond that however, the lines. '. become blurroor_aspolicyfonnulation:·becomes .subject.·to
competing demands. State domination and control gives way, but not
without complex relationships t() the past. ~.this chapter, we examine
the prOCess of change by attempting to identify the key elements of this
hybrid system, focusing on several aspects of transformation, each of
which, in some way, is connected to ownership. We shall first place these
. matters in hiStorical context, and then describe the framework within
which key decisions are made: the sources of law and policy.
Thestructure and process for defining ownership rest upon an unstable
foundation: most media organs, state--owned and private, print and
electronic, are beset by .severe financial pressures, but of perhaps even
greater consequence for media policy as a whole is the infancy anc!-
plasticity of the regulatory framework. Broadcasting ownership policy is
political, in thit personal and political rivalries appear as·greater arbiters
ofownership issues thari do decisions made in a regulatory structure.
A limited legal framework for decision-making exists, but is largely
unavailable as a means oHlamessmg theflow''Of-events '50 as to-eStilblish
conditions of stability. The Government has the contradictory goals of·
weaning state broadcasters from severely-limited budgets while at the
same time retaining forms of ownership control. Intense struggle
between governmental branches and agencies are facilitated by the
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absence of transparency and predictability in regulation. Because a
coherent structure is lacking, the voices of policy articulation are diffuse.
Up to now, the President's voice has been heard most loudly, but
consensus is lacking. '.
Dynamics of ownership and control, 1991-1995
Only six tumultuous years ago, media ownership and control were
exclusively in the hands oHhe Soviet state and CommwlistParty, the
latter acting as...a powerful interlOCUtor to ,.suppr.ess~rivalries between
governmental branches.1 Following the enactment in March 1990,' of
constitutional amendments which stripped the Party of its political
monopoly and extra-IegaI role as supervisOr of goverilmental functions,
Soviet lawmakers initiated reforms whiCh shaped the basic outlines Of the
.' hybrid media ownership'policy to the present day: the acceptance of both
private and state forms of ownership.
The foundations of this hybrid ownership policy .:.:.... this. 'diversity
.principle' - were fust established in June 1990, with enactment of the
USSR's first law? to explicitly outlaw censorship and monopoly
ownership fu all mass media. Article 7 of the 1990 Press Lawdeclai'ed
that the right·· to establish media outlets belonged not only to
governmental legislative and administrative bodies, but to a variety of
public organisations and individruil adult citizens, as well. .
The 1990 Law is no longer in effect as a result of the dissolution of the
USSR in Decernber, 1991, However, its successor statute, the Mass Media
.Law which became effective in February, 1992 (which we refer to here as
the 1992 Mass Media Law), and which remains in effect today,
reaffirmed this diversity principle.3 Article. 7 of the 1992 Mass Media
Law, entitled 'Founder', reads as follows: '[tlhe founder (ro-founder) of a
f For background on the reforms of the early 1990., suMichael J. Bazyler and Eugene Sadovoy,-
'Government Regulation and Privalisation of EIeetroJijc Mass Media in RUI;.ia and the Other Former
SoVlet Republic.', 14 Whilfier LAw Rtuiew 427 (1993); Peter Krug, 'The Abandonment of the State
Radio-Television Monopoly in the Soviet Union: The FirstStep Toward Broadcasting Pluralism?',
9Wisconsin InternafiolVl! lAw Joumal377 (1991). .
2 Zakon 0 pedtali i druifrh sredstvtzkh ttUlSSOfJOi injormafsii fLAw an Ihe Press and OtherMeans ofMasg
Information], Vedomosti s'ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. No. 26, Item
.492 (1990) [hereinafrer 1990 PRESS LAWL translated in 42 Current Digest ofthe SalJiet Press, No. 25 (25
July 1990), at 16. .
3 Zakon 0 sredstlJakJr r1U/SSQOoi infcmnalsii (LAw on Mass Injorn1lJtUm Media), Vedomosti .'""da
narodnyl<h deputatov rosstiskoi federatsti i verkhovnogo soveta rossilskoi federatsii, No.7, Irem 300
.(1992) (enacted Xl December 1991, effective 8February 1992) [hereinafte! Ma.s Media Law]. Foran
English translation and commentary on the Mass Media Law, see Monroe E. Price, 'Comparing
Broadcast Structures: Transnational Perspectives and Post-Communist Examples', 11 Cardozo Arts &
Enl. L. J. 275, 285-96, 625-55 (1993). The diverOity principle is set forth in Article 7.
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mass media outlet may be a citizen, an association of citizens, an
enterpriSe, instihrtion, organisation, or state organ.'
The first manifestation of broadcasting diversity came in the dying days
of the USSR not with private ownership, but with creation of a second
state--oWnedchannel, Russian Television,4 as the voice of the Russian
Republic and Boris Yeltsin rivalling the powerful all-USSR first channel
knOwn popularly as 'Ostankino'.5 Since that time, the story has been one
marked by two predominant themes: the clash between goverrunental
branches over control of state-owned mass media, and the gradual
development of a private sector. The latter included' the emergence of
private advertising and production entities which did considerable
.business with Ostankino, despite its ownership by the state.
In the first years of post-Soviet Russia, however, it was not the
developmerit Of a private sphere which· took centre stage.· Instead,
reallocation of cOntrol of the media, eSpecially televiSion,· became the
harsh focus of bloOd, inter-institutional struggle and political division.
Nothing in the 1992 Mass Media Law dealt explicitly with the allocation
of power between branches of govenunent, between the President and
Parliament. But as the intense division among competing forces for
public 10yaItytook place, the media was a flash point, one that ultimately
resulted in President Yeltsin's calling for new elections, the closing down
of the Parliament, armed combat for control and the sto~g of
Ostankino.
Newspapers, freer than broadcasting, were nonetheless an arena for
battles for control. In the post-&>V:iet period, as paper and prInting costs
reached world levels, government subsidies became neCessary for
survival for most papers. The pattern of ~stenal subsidies for mass
media, Under proposed Parliamentary action, would be subjected to
scrutiny, and a legislative standard.regarding.the·amount,of..cirGulation.·.
would be established for such subsidies, .but the suspicion always
remained that distribution of subsidies had political implications.
Ail example of. the struggle for control was the status of the major
newspaper 12vestia. Founded by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union
as its organ, tinder its direction and control, the newspaper had been
accountable to those in control of the political body.
With the dissolution.of the Soviet Union, the question of succession
arose. Journalists voted to claim the paper for themselves, invoking the
4 Now VGfRK or All-Russian Television and Radio Company.
5 See below [0[ a discussion of its trans{ormation into Russian Public Television.
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spirit, if notfue letter, of the 1992 Media Law. The Russian Parliament
cIaimedthat as inheritor of the mantle of the Supreme Soviet, it was the
publisher, and, as such, controlled the assets and editorial direction of the
paper. The issue became particularly important because, at a critical
moment in· the .constitutional life of· the nation, the influential paper
seemed. to favour the President over the views articulated by the
Parliament and its Speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov. 'Freedom of the Press,'
became a.rallying,cry for. those supporting the journalists and opposing
greater parliamentary power. The journalists succeeded, and the victory
was marked as a tribute to greater press autonomy; in fact, the outcome
was also.a measure of shifting political power.6
The battles betWeen the President and Parliament over control of the
electronic media helpea precipitate.the great and . convulsive
gOvemmenlal crisis of 1993. The anger, or at least struggle~ between
Parliament and the President cOncerning the' machinery of media
reguIation remained intense, ugly and censOrious, though never so much
as in the first two years of post-Soviet Russia. This basic tension remains
unresolved today.
Meanwhile, with less controversy, the second strain at the diversity
principle - private. ownership - has been increasing. It is now
necessary to look at· the legal framework· within which mass media
operate. before examining in more det:iill. the forms of state ownership,
'public' broadcasting, and private o~ership.
Framework: sources oflaw and policy
A broad range of ownership forms now exists in Russian mass media,
pursuant to· the statutory diversity principle? However, beyond the
explication of this principle in Article 7 of the Mass Media Law, the
sources of substantive law and policy are diffuSe, and clear lines of
authority are lacking. So far, the dOminant role on ownership issues has
been and remains the executive, which has the constitutional authority to
issue decreeswhich have the force of lawS and to veto legislative action:
Within the government areagencies established to oversee the print
media9 and television and radio broadcasters1o•
.6 For a de~ed accounfof the Iz!1estia controversy, 5ee Jamey Cambrell, 'Moscow; The Front Page:
Nf!1IJ York RnJif!1IJ ofBooks 39, 00.16 (8 Oct 1992~S6.
7 Thi5 includes not only broadca5te[5, cable televi5ion and print media, but also numerOU5 private
production ·5tudio5. .
8 Presidential decree5 carry the force of law under Article 90 of the 1993 Russian Constitution.
9 The Federal Committee on the Press. A major function·of.the Committee i5 the di5persal of
budgetaiy sub5idies to variou5 print media.
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As indicated, the RussianParliament has long taken an intense interest in
mass media ownership issues. The Parliament has debated and
generated numerous legislative proposals on a broad range of issues,
induding 1995 legislation on broadcasting regulation, privatisation of
state broadcasters,u and state financial support for the mass media.
Because it plays an important role in approving the state budget, the
Parliament also makescrudal determinations as to the amounts and
allocation of funds for state broadcasters and print media subsidies.
The judidary has been virtually absent from the debate: although the
1993 Russian Constitution contains broad guarantees for the exercise of
free expression, including freedom of the mass information media, these
indeterminate provisions have thus far not received interpretation or
direct application in the courts and cannot be considered an effective
source oflaw.l2 .
The fundamental statute remains the 1992 Mass Media Law. In additioo
to articulating the basis for a pluralistic owrier~hip system, it seeks to
define !he rights and duties of the various component parts of mass
media enterprises. Thus/like many of the first generation of media la:ws
throughout the region, it was a time-based monument to the idea ofnew
freedoms and transformation. These laws, as a group, were idealistic in
construct and celebrated as an artefact of the new order. In the brutal
year after dissolution of the Soviet Union, during adjustment to' new
realities, perspectives' on the nature and function of law .were
substantially altered. The 1992 law was largely about press immunity
from Government intervention,' focuSing on the rights of ioumalisfs
against their publishers and editors, and with the rights of citizens and
journalists against the state. .
'Ilie law did not reveal the power relationshipsarnong competitors:
would there be an all-powerful state broadcasting authority.with.priv:ate ..
entities only at the margin? Could government assure 'diversity' in terms
10 The Federal Se'rviOO on Television and Radio Broadcasting. A major function of the Federal Service
is licensing of broadcasters, which is assigned to a federal Licensing Commission. According to a
Russian language publication, as of June 1995, the FOderal Service had issued some 250 television
licenses•.
11 These two bills were "etoed by President YellSin in June, 1995. See 'Yeltsin Vetoes Broadcastins.:
Anti-ORT Bills', Posl- S""iel Media lJirJ) and Policy N_kIIEf, Issue 19, June, 1995, p. 1; [hereinafter,
'PSMLPN'j. . .
12 See Article 29 of the ConstitUtion. Whatits provisions inean, if anything, in concrete terms for
matters of ownership, and perhaps e"en more importantly control, has not been determined. Thus, at
this stage, Russia offers a sharp contrast to the type of active judicial supervision associated with, for
example, the German Constimtional Court. . . .
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of an imposed outcome in which many voices are guaranteed to be
heard?, Or would the solution be market-Qriented, in which the state
withdraws and has little assurance as to the organic composition of the
resulting economic circumstance? The law itself, 'like many media
statutes, was tantalising concerning these questions, but not sufficiently
detailed to allow the neutral observer to predict what would occur. We
tum to the patterns that have emerged.
Ownershippattems: full state ownership, the competition for control
The state itself, and government branches and agencies,13 continue to
own important disseminators of information and entertainment, such as
Russian'TV [the second channel],14 a number of radio stations, and a
number of newspapers. In this regard, it is particularly noteworthy that
in a country of Russia's enormous breadth and' recent centripetal
tendencies, that many regional and local media organs are owned by
their respective regional and local govemmental agencies.
For example, the Moscow city-owned cable television channel, which has
exerted its muscle via rigorous enforcement of laws against independent
cable television studios, initiated full services to some seven million city
residents inNOvember 1995, with service to reach all residents in January
1996. Moreover, and of great importance to the question of control, is the
fact that the state continues as the exclusive owner of vital means of
distribution, such as the transmission of telev'..sion and radio signals, as .
well as production, suchas newsprint and pnnting facilities.
Ownership is a clue, in another vital way, to analysing the effect of the
media in shaping national identity. Should the government, directly or
indirectly, be able to establish and operate an instrument of mass
information? One could conceive the answer to this question as a,
hallmark determinant about the nature of the state and its potential for
shaping public opinion and fostering loyalties. Most Western
democracies have had state-controlled, or heavily state-:-influenced
broadcasters; in a sense, that, is what public service broadcasting has
been. The United States has been relatively unique in its historic policy of
13 The distinction here is that the .tate, as the ultimate legal entity; is the legal owner of the assets of
certain enterprises which are financed directlyas line ,item. frOOllhe state budget The governmental
branches and agendes, on the other hand, act as 'founders' - the ooncept examined below - and
finance their mass media organs out of their budgetary allotments. By 'branches: we refer to the,
executive and legislative organs, and by 'agencies: to governmental bodies such as the MinistIy of
Communications.
14 UntilApril 1995, the powerful first channel was also owned entirelyby the state. Since,that time, it
has been,converted LQ a purportedly public channel (see ;njRz), butwith the state retaini;'g51 per<ent
ownership. '
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ambivalence toward all but the private. The Russian law would permit,
in Article 7, any 'state organ' to found a mass media outlet. IS The statute
denotes contiriuity with the environment of the past, a situation in which
great powers in the society - ministries, unions, even Parliament - can
be founders of newspapers.
The simple fact of state ownership, however, has not meant the abserlCe
of fierce divisions within theGovernment over the direction and ultimate
'control of mass media organs. On the contrary, in the tense political
climate since 1992, the state-owned mass media, particularly television,
have been a central battleground between the presidential and legislative
forces. Much of that struggle has centred on claims to the unique legal
concept of the 'founder'; a cOncept linked to the vital concern,with
, contr()l.
OwneIShip patterns: concept of the founder
For those mass media Involved in the dissemination of information and
ideas, the 1992 Mass Media Law presupposed a formal structure for each
mass media entity, which is to include three distinct components: a
founder, an editor-in-drief, and a journalists' collective. The concept of
'founder' is itself an interesting artefact of free speech-theory: In the
Soviet period, all mass media were organs of the Government or of the
Party; the transition to another fOrm of collective ownership had to take
place through the creation of' sponsoring organisations, not private
'publishers. Conseqllently, the device of 'founder' was invented, ~n<ind of
intermediary betWeen Govemment and Party on the one hand, and
journalists on the other.l6
The 1992 Russian Federation Law on Mass Media illustrates this concero
with control, specifying the relationship between the 'founder' and the
staff for most 'mass media.'17 Together, the' editor-:-in-dJief and the
journalists' collectiv~_are known as 'the editorship.' Article 19 of the~s
Media Law states that the editorship performs its tasks 'on the basis of
professional independence,' and Article 18 states that the founder cannot
interfere with the editorship except as the founder and, the editorship
have agreed. A' status agreement is required to cover a number of
extremely important points (Articles 16 and 20). '
For example, it sets forth the circumstances Under which the owner may
close the newspaper. The document must also set forth how the editor-
IS'S"; Article 7, 'SUP'" note '- and accompanying text.
16 Interview with Professor Yuri Baturin, author of the Union Press Law, in Moscow (3 Feb. 1993).
17 1992 Mass Media IDw, Articles 18-22.
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in-dlief is appointed and, preswnably, how he or she is removed, The
agreement would specify what powers the journalists' collective
possesses and what happens if there is a proposed change in ownership
or constituency. Under Article 22, the foooder and the editor are also to
agree as to the very important financial side of prodUCing an instrument.
of mass information. For example, they should agree on 'ensuring proper
education and social domestic living conditions and labour conditions for
the editorialoffic~associates,'
The authority of the 'founder' or the existence of an emergency become
important analytical. tooLS. In normal circumstances, the law requires
government .to follow certain extremely important procedural
requirements if it is acting to enforce terminate the activity of a mass
media outlet's activity pursuant to Article 4 of the Mass Media Law.
These procedural safeguards stipulate that a mass media outlet may be
terminated or suspended but only upon judicial review and only after
proof of multiple violations during the prior 12 months and the prior
issuance of written warnings. But, and this is the magic of law, these
procedural safeguards do not apply if the action is taken by the
'founder',18 .
The powers and problems of asserting 'foundership' can be fuund in the
take-over and reorientation of the neWSpaper Rossiiskaia Gazda, a paper
for which the Parliament had been the founder, during the tense days on
the eve of the October 1993 events. In late September, the Government
installed a new editor-in--chief, Natalia lvanovna Polezhaeva, who
initiated radical changes in personnel and. editorial directions. These
actions brought her into conflict with the journalists of the paper who, in .
a 27 September meeting voiced their unanimous objection to the take-
over and claimed that the substitution of founders had b€en illegal.
In the American context, one does not ordinarily think of government as
ordering a particular design fur the internal structure of a newspaper
organisation or a television network There is no guarantee in American
law that an editor will be 'independent' of the publisher. To the extent
that an editor is independent, it is a result of tradition, not·a
constitutional or statutory right. It is also rare, unless reflected in the
ownership structure, for journalists, as a body, to have rights
independent of collective bargaining agreements,I9
18 Ibid., Article 16.
19 Su~h agreements usually deal with the economic terms and conditions of employment.
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From this perspective, looking at the shards of the Russian law, a
. perverse statism appears. The architects seem to over define freedom,.
stamping out any interference with the journalist, whether by the
government or by the publisher. Accordingly, the legislation must posit
how an· instrument of mass information should be organised by
imposing limits on how the editor is i hired and fired, as well as by
providing both the journalists and· the editor with .. specific rights
concerning the financial and editorial management of the publication.
The authors ofthe law - the architects of the building we are trying to
reconstruct - considered these provisions as additional guarantors of
freedom.
But the law is strangely limiting. It discourages foreign investment and is
dependent on the state to sanction intemal agreements. Consequently, it
is likely to leild to less diversity and innovation than might otherwise be
the case. The greater the opportunities for disputatious friction between
publisher and edito;;, the more likely the state will be called in as
arbiter.2o ,.
Ownership patters: towardprivatisation? Russian public broadcaslin.lt.
In a stunning demonstration of executive power, President Yeltsin has
with two decrees21 fashloned a concept which is rapidly becoming the
model .for privatisation of Russian state broadcasters - the novel
concept, perhaps unique - of Russian 'public'broadcastirlz with Its
somewhat cramped conception of 'the public: Since 1991, there has been
considerable discussion, much of it fuelled by the desire to wean state
broadcasters away from shrinking budgets,22 about the traJisformationof
Russia's national channcls into jofrtt stock companies, with more of a
.corporate existence and diverse ownership. . .
However, such plans have collided with the competing and
contradictory goal of retaining slate control. UnderYeltsin~s.formuia _.
an attempt to reconcile these seemingly incompatible interests - the
characteristics of public broadcasting have begun to take shape: sale of
20 In an earlier draft of the starnte,·the broadcast licensing authority could require at least a statement.
of how much time will be devoted to foreign programmes and to transmissions from any
Commbnwea1t1l-wide entity. Article 33(1) would have allowed a requirement that the licensee .
distribute 'information and materials of organs of government power and leadership.'
21 30 November 1994, 'On Improving the Use of Channel One (Moscow) Television and Its
Distribution Network' [SSe Summary ofWarrd.STOIldcasts, 2 December 1994]; 6 October 1995, 'On
improving Radio and Television Broadcasting in the Russian Federation' [SSe Summary ofWorld
STllIldc:n.sts, 20 October 1995J. .
22 Much of this driven not only by capital expenditures, but also by enormous distribution.a~d
transmission costs.
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state assets, abaridonment of state budget funding, reliance on
advertising revenues, infusion of private capital, but with the state
retaining a majority of the assets. .
The first step in development of this concept came in President Yeltsin's
decree of 30 November 1994. He ordered conversion of the powerful first
channel~ 'Ostankino'. A study of that transformation, leading to a new
entity -Russian.public Television, or ORT - is ,po:p1icUlarly instnictive
in demonstrating the difficulties 6f transition.23
The 'privatisation' of ORT had several important features: first, the
President determined which companies would become shareholders in.
the .new network. second, the Government determined (perhaps with the
assistance of the companies) what the price of their shares wouldbe.
There was no auction, either to determine who would become investors
or what the value· of the shares should be. Indeed, it is likely that there
was rio 'price' for becoming a shareholder except for the very likely
burden of covering losses incurred during the next several years.
Another feature of the change in ownership was that, after it was
announced, the Duma sought to cancel it and, ultimately, demonstrated a
.sufficient strength of objection that the new, 'privatised' ORT was, at
least initially, hobbled by a rruindatorily. imposed relationship with
aspects of the shell ofOstankino. . .
Thus, some of the economies that might have been available to an
unimpeded private entity were foregone. ORT was required to take and
. broadcast certain productions of Ostankino, as an example. The Duma's
objections were not, however, that the absence of auction meant that the
Government was cheated. Rather, for many in the Duma, it was wrong
for the Govenunent to give up much of its control over television. Some
contended, furthermore, that the President was 'privatising' the network
by giving it to his supporters iri industry rather than have it open to .
intervention from opposing politicians, including opposing candidates in
the 1996 elections.
The path of ORT could be said, also, to reflect Changes in the distribution
of power in the society. The bariks and other companies that became the
chosen shareholders in ORT were the new decision-makers, the adjuncts
to government power, ifnot goveminentitself.
23 UnJik<! many other state assets, broadcasting was excluded from statutory privatisation ""heme.,
presumably because of its peroeived social·value. This gave Yeltsin more room to formulate his own







Also vital was the fact that 'privatisation' of ORT meant retaining 51 per
cent of the stock in the new company in government hands. Part would
be in the Government itself, and part in the s~te property committee.
The authority to determine who would be the operating head of ORT
also remained, de facto, if not de jure, in the hands of the Government,
probably of the President.
The list of founders of Public Russian Television (PRT) designed to take
over Ostankino television as of April 1, 1995 was published in Sovetskaya
Rossiya, No 30, pp. 1-2, March 14, by Deputy of the State Duma Vladimir
Isakov24: '
Table 1: OfiT shareholders
,7
RF Goskomimushcheslvo [state Property
Committee of the Russian Federation]
3,600,000
Oslankino Slate Television and Radio Co. 900,00 9
Television Technical Centre lstate enterprise] 300,00"-, ' 3
ITAR-TASS news agency 300,000 3
Association of Independent1V COmpanies joint-
stock company
300,000 3
l..JJgoVAZ. joinktock company 800,000 .8,
Inkombank 500,000 5
Menalep Bank 500'000 5
National Credit Bank 500,000 5
Slolichny Bank 500,000 5
Alpha-Bank , 500,000 5
Obyedinenny (United) Bank 800,000 8
Microdinjoinktock company 500,000 5
Total 10,000,000 100
24 PRT Boardof Directors; A. N. Yakovlev- Chairman, Ostankin~Russian State Television and
Radio Co., Chairman of the Board; B. Berezovsky- Director...(;eneral, AVVA joint-<;toek Co.,
Deputy Chairman of iIle Board. Board Melpbers: O. Boiko - Chairman of the Board, National Credit
bank; V. Vinogriidov - President.lnkombank; v. Gorokhov~ Director, Television Technical Centre;
A. Yefanov - President. Mcrodin joint-stock Co.; S. Zhaboyev- Director--eenera~togoVAZ joint-
stock Co.; V. 19natenko':'-Directot-General, ITAR-TASS news agency; K Ignatyev - ChairrnalV RF
State Duma Subcommittee on TV and Radio; I. Lesnevskaya ~Chairmanof the Board, Association
of Independent Television Companies; A. Smolensky - Preside.nt, Srolidmy bank; S. Tarpishchev-
Chairman, RF State Committee for Physical Culture and Tourism; M Fri€dman - Chairman of the
Board, Alpha-Bank; M Khodorkovsky -Chairman of the Board, Menatep bank; k.Chubais ~,.Firsr
Vice-Premier of Russian Fe?eration"government. .
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Not surprisingly, in the wake of the murder of Vladislav Listyev, ORT's
first director-general, on 1 March 1995, the future of the entire Ostankino
privatisation plan was subject to greater scrutiny and became more
politically volatile. ..
The Chair of the Dwna Committee on Labour and Social Support, Sergei
Kalaslmikov, had, three weeks before Listyev's murder,urged
establishment of a commission to examine the privatisation of Ostankino,
calling.it probao!y the most mysterious reorganisation of the past three
years. He criticised the privatisation as outside the President's authority
and a1sd without any tender or investment competition. In his View,
Ostankino was preposterously undervalued in terms of the contribution
required of private investorS for the shares they received in the new
entity's assets. Furthermore, the regulations stipulate that none of the
shareholders has the right to sell any share without the permission of the
council of directors and without the permission of the Government.
In March 1995, the Duma was only 28 votes short of passing a
nationalisation of much of Russian television.. The action was headed by
Vladimir Zhirinovsky who called his initiative another velvet revolution.
Instead, the Duma passed a moratorium on privatisation at the first
reading.
Later, the Duma passed an anti-privatisation bill which Yeltsin vetoed. In
a dear illuStration of the political nature of the confrontation, voting on
this legislation broke down almost evenly along party lines, with very
few supporters .of the PreSident vo~g for it.25
Further articulation of the public broadcasting concept came in October
1995,with President Yeltsin's decree calling for privatisation of the
Ostankino production centre and creation of publicentities from among
a number of Russia's radio broadcasters. .
Despite thac demonstration of raw presidential power, however, the
Yeltsin decrees do little to. define the c6ntours of Russian media
ownership policy. They contain considerable substantive ambiguity.
What dOes it mean to say that the affairs of Ostankino will be 'wound
uP'?·
Left unanswered are a host of questions:
• w~ch state entitieswill be chosen for conversion to public status?
25 AJel<sei Kirpidmikov, 'The Duma Wants to Tum Off Public Television', Sevodnya, 6 April 1995,
p. 2 (Trans. in Current Digesl D/the Post-S01Jiel Press, Vol XLVII, No. 14, p. 12, (3 May 1995),
reproduced in PSMLPN, issue 18, 23 May i995, p. 4-5. Fo' example, five per cent of the Russia's
Choice Party voted lor the bill.
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• whatfactors will determine the method (auction, tender, privilege) or
the goals of privatisation?
.• to whom will offers of participation be made available, and why?
• who exactlyowns companies such as ORT?
• what does' private 'ownership' mean, where the power to transfer
such right is prohibited without permission of govenunent agencies?
Thus, perhaps the private 'l?,wners' of Russian Public Television are
similar to brQadcast Iicense-:holders under US law,' who are, at least
sometimes,viewed as trustees rather than owners of the goveriunent
benefit and who must obtain permission of the Federal Communications
Commission to transfer that license.26
Moreover, adding to the confusion, is the fact that the alleged driving
force behind privatisation atall- budgetary relief - at the preSent time
is frustrated. ORT still operates out of the state budget. As the noted
former Information Minister, Mikhail Poltoranin, has said: They will be
financed out of the state pocket, but it won't~ a state company'.
In the end, it may be concluded that much of this ambiguity stems from
the contradictory goals of Russian public broadcasting. Poltoranin is,
agirin,an interesting commentator: 'a state that has many television
channels and many radio channels, and also has such colossal- budget ..
deficits must look for some options, but at the same time retain its state
control because they are like atom bombs'. . .
As to an institutional base, public broadcasting in Russia is but a
manifestation of presidential policy, a result of Yeltsin decrees. Reflecting
this fact is his veto of the Parliament's anti-privatisation legisIationP The
concept shows no particular signs of evolution, and without any basis in
legal. principles it could be altered or doneaw'ay with at any tini.e~IfstiCh
were' to happen, it is unclear what property rights, if any, the private
shareholders would have. In this regard, the Constitutional Court in
.November 1995 declined to rule on the merits of a Parliamentary petition
to review the President's 30 November 1995 ORT decree. In so doing, the
court chOse not to take the opportunity both to rule on the institutional
conflict between executive and legislature, but alSo to provide some
specificity and applicability to the free expression guarantees in Article 29
of the constitution. As to process, this episode shows little. .
26 Article 310(d), Federal Communications Act (47 ·USC sec. 31O(d)).
27 See footnote. 11.
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•"'PiivateownefShip
Substantial elements of Russiars mass media outlets are privately ownedr
induding the widely-viewed NTV and TV6, a variety of more local
broadcasting and cable outletsr and many print media outlets. All mass
media outlets, under the 1992 Mass Media Law, are subject to a
registration regimer and operation of. a broadcasting station requires
licensesr as well.28
We have mentioned the provisions for the registration and internal
management of mass media.29 A' statute that requires pre-publication
registration with discretionary approval makes some statement about the
potential role of the state. A registration scheme can be non-threatening
by limiting the discretion of the registratiOn authority.
The 1992 Mass Media Law tries to accomplish this by conStraining the
power of the. registering authority to grant or deny registration. Because
there are liinits on who can establish the mass media outlet, a registration
could be refused if the ownership or· structure is improper. More
troublesome is the power to deny a registration of the applicant where
the registering authority knows that the.cOntent to be produced w9tiId
violate the law (for exampler that it would foment dass or national
intolerance).30
National power to register ~ to legitimise - implies a power to
deregisterr to doser -to rdelegitimiser;Therelationship between a
publication'and the stater and the capacity of the state to influence
content (often not so subtly) is a function of this harshest of sanctions: the
power of the Government actually to dose down a mass media outlet.
One could conceive of a statutory scheme that gave no such power,
relying, if necessaryr on the ordinary authority of the state to punish
individuals for criminal acts, or to collect taxes, or to impose damages for.
injury inflicted. The Russian law has the beguiling appearance of
liberaIisationr but also an implied sense that the Government can step in
28 1992 Mass Media LDw, Articles 7-16, 31-32.
29 Ibid., Articles 7-24-
30 Ibid. art. 13. The registration authority could have established separate fees for registrants based on
the following: 1) fees for instruments of mass information thatspec:ialise in the production of
advertising or erotic material could bt> higher, while; 2) publications for children, youths, invalids,
and for ed'ucation and culture could be lower. This power is an important one because it would give_
an agency the need to decide on a discriminatory fee structure and some authority to decide what
constitutes a publication in each category. - -
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when something is dreadfully wrong. Article 16govems the power to
close down the mass media.31
The statute, beca'~ it undertakes to regwate the internal working of the
press and because it would confer special privileges on the preSs, must
define the press~ This )eads to a hypothesis worth testing in construing
draft media legislation: from a statute's definition of the press, one can
infer a definition of the state. Therecould be a corollary: from a statute's
definition of the powers of the state, one can infer the natUre of the press.
In ,the Urnted States, one unusual and intriguing aspect ,of .First
Amendment jurisprudence is that, over time, definitions of 'the press'
have almost disappeared, even though the' amendment, specifically
prohibits Congress frOm abridging 'freedom'of speech and of the press.'
There has been the understanding that the press is freer if it has the rights
of mere speakers in sOciety than if it has more specific rights that come
from a defined status. Under the RussiaIl law, the 'press,' referred to as a
'mass medium,' has a' defined status; each publication has a stated
purpose and a stated range of publication, each registers, and each has an
announced internal structure. '
A registration 'scheme often conditions permission to publish on the
proper kind of ownership, and oWnership restrictions provide one of the
most importarltfusightsinto the national tendencies of a media law.
Foreign owneIShip
One marker of concerns abOut ownershipinvolves restrictions on foreign
control and limitations on foreign investment Similar agonies of national
identity affected almost all of the either states in the former SOcialist bloc.
h1 each, the problem of definiitg the new state a,ndfashioning identities
coexisted 'with the tasks of transformation, economic change, and
reorderirtgof the media. Control of thiS process - power over the
narrative - became a central element in the restructuring of the media.
, .
31 Article 16 of the Russi.:n Media La~ is ~ntitled Tem'inationand cessation ojactroity, During the run-
up 10 the 25 Apn11993 referendum. the Ministry of Information SOUghl closure pf a newspaper for
'collective fabricalei:l'hooliganisms.' Moscow Evening New. (20'Apr. 1993). The then-Minister of
'Information,,Mikhail Poltoranin, issued awarning to Sor;etskaia RDsSiiJJ, which the newspaper was
required to'caay in its 27 June 1992 edition. The minister quoted an article about picketing al
Dotankino. 'Russia's govemmenlhas launched a bloody war against its own people .. ,blood is being
shed in Moscow's streets, ..:More than two hundred people were injured, There are fatalities....The
minisier pointed out thai the lePOlts 'have been officially denied as nol corresponding to the facts.'
Russian Press Dig'<S~RusData DiaLine.. 27 June 1992. Subsequently. at the time of the spring 1993
ccisis, the Minister of Press and Infolenation initiated Court action 10 close down Sor;etskaia Roosiia and
another paper, Den'. Press Conference ofMinister of Infocmation;Mikhail FedolOv, 23 Marcch.I992.
Fed. Info, Sys, Corp" Official Kremlin Int1 New Broadcast
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kt Russia, .thes~' questions ;~mainUnresolved. In the Mass Media Law, a
foreign citizen cannot act as a 'founder' of a mass media outlet, nor can
persons without ci~enship who do not live continuously within the
boundaries of the Russian Federation.32 'This provision has not prevented
foreigners from owning mass media outlets within Russia, as. is
evidenced by Turner Broadcasting's fomier approximately SOper cent
stake (sold atthe behest of its Russian partner in 1994, not because of
Government,action) in private broadcaster TV6.The reason is that the
1992 Mass Media Law restricts only alien founders, and not owners. The
draft broadcasting statute passed by the Parliament in 1995 did contain
an ownership restriction on foreign ownership 6f broadcast licensees,.33
however, President Yeltsin's veto of that legislation left the ownership
matter unresolved.34
In additiort, the 1992 Mass Media Law, Article 54, states that Russian
citizens are guaranteed unhindered access to 'reports and material of the
foreign mass media.' However, somewhat contradictorily, the same
Article requires permission from the Russian Ministry of Press and
Infonnation (now the Committee on the Press) to disseminate periodical
print publications which are not registered in Russia, do not have a
Russian founder and editorial office, and which are financed by a foreign
stale or person. Regarding television broadcasts from outside, however,
Article 54 stipulates that they may be limited only in cases specified in
international agreements to which Russia is a party.
licensing ..
It is clear that operation of a broadcasting outlet requires licenses from
two governmental bodies - the Federal Service on Television and Radio
Broadcasting, and the Ministry of Communications (or their regional
branches for local broadcasters). Broadcast licensing, in any legal system,
presents complex issues of who should exercise such authority and the
ancillary regulatory functions which accompany it, what standards
should .be imposed· and the nature of institutional review of such
decision-making. These complexities are compounded in Russia by the
32 1992 Mass Media Law, Article 7.
33 PSMLPN, No 12-13,at Supp. p.6. Article 35(3) denied the opponunity ta hold a broadcast license
ta legal entities not registered in Russi", as well as to entities owned or controlled more than 49 per,
cent by aliens.
34 In the United States, print media can be owned by anyone. However, the Federal Communications
Act. 47 USc. sec. 310(b) prohibits the grant of a broadcast license to 'any alien or the representative of
any alien: places percentage limitations on foreign ownership or control of broadcast licensees, and
gives the Federal Communications Commission discretion to deny a license to any corporation which
is directly or indirecdy controlled by any other corporation which is owned or controlled more than
25 per cent by aliens. The US alien ownelShip policy is under scrutiny in Congress.
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newness of the system, and the absence of express constitutional or
statUtory commands. '. . ..
In November 1995, the director of NlV, Oleg MaJashenko, chastised the
President of All-Russian Television and Radio, Oleg Poptsov, for the
latter's reluctance to grant:Nrv exclusive use of broadcasting channel
four. The exchange, while hot in itself earth-shaklng, reveals the
ambiguities of a private broadcaster in Russia. A license Simply lacks
legal attributes - granted on presidential whiII\ it could be taken away
just as easily. To understand the tenuous nature of NTV's license, it is
nec~ssary to examine the nature ofthe grant itself. .
The precarious nature of NTV's authority to broadcast on any channel, is
illustrated by its origins in late'1993. Financed by a consortium of Russian
banks, which invested some $US7,OOO,OOO in hard currency for its
operations inOctoller-December 1993, and announced their intent to
invest some $US25,OOO,OOO for 1994 operations, NTV commenced
broadcasting in October with an attractive programrrung fonnat centring
on neWs programming featuring dozens of fonner Ostankino and
Russian lV journalists for' several hours per day on St. Petersburg
channel five.
However, it was clear that this was only temporary,· and that NTV
sought the much ,more valuable use of the fourth channel, which offered
expanded airtime and a far Wider potential audienf:e througheut-mu&{)f
European Russia. This interest set in motion a bizarre tum ofevents. On
23 November 1993, President Yeltsin issued a short-lived decree granting
NJV'srequest to use the fourth channel; only to rescind it a few hours
later. Reportedly, NTV had become a political football kicked betWeen
Yeltsin's lieutenants some of whom favoured the grant and.others who .
opposed it as having been drafted in secrecy by the bankers and their
lobbyists. The story, of course, did not end there. On 22 December 1993;
Yeltsin re-issued the decree, ordering government agencies to issue NTV
a license for Use of a portion of the fourth channel within one month - a
license which NTV continues to hold.
The episOde, however, highlights some difficult questions abOut both the
process and the substantive law. N'Tv's grant is the product· of
.presidential fiat - a decision lacking in any form of transparency or
explicated ratioriaIe. Moreover, what is the nature of the 'right' that NTV
holds? As the controversy with its co-holder. of the ~el
.demonstrates, it does not extend to ~clusive use of fourth channel itself,
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a fact which reflects the tenuous nature of the grant itself - if so easily
given, it can easily be taken away.35
Thus, while ownership pluralism is well established, the fate of
individual broadcasters is political, rather than legal. The 1992 Mass
Media Law is too abstract, providing no guidance on this question, and
broadcasting legislation has been vetoed which would have provided a
firmer textual base for license rights. The broadcasting draft, in a section
,entitled 'Gu<frant~ of'litense-holders' rights'l'states··thatJ -A. broadcast
license is the single necessary legal basis for using a frequency... on the
territory of the Russian Federationfor the purpose'of radio and television
broadcasting..: 36 Of even greater significance were provisions which
articulated in considerable detail the enumerated grounds for license
issuance and revocation, with explicit opportunity for appeal to the
courts.37 Meanwhile, more recently, a new licensing structure,
established by the President, 'has corne into being. However, it lacks
structure '. and, probably, independence. Similarly, while the Federal
Radio and Television Service is functioning smoothly, issuing licenses,
elaborating policies, none of this exists on a solid foundation - all is
subject to change'; to political manipulation and in-fighting.
Conclusion , , "
Media policies and legislation are changing in Russia, but the causes area
complex corribination of political, institutional, market and tedmological
requirements. The market potential exists for change, as is indicated by
changes in programme format and the rapid growth of private
broadcasting. But, the developments exist side by side: the dramatic
rhetoric and forceful regulation of the political process, the processes of
popular demand, and the introduction of independent broadcasting. Still,
the political process, the driving force for the initial thrust of diversity~
the creation Of RusSian 1V to DvalGorbachev's USSRlV- continues to
shape the agenda as shown by the .controversies and direction of public
broadcasting, ,
Where is national policy as to ownership in the future? Much depends on
whether vast presidential power is likely to continue and how the Duma
and the Federation Council change. Seldom does it seem that the shaping
35 This exp1aiti~ the recent cutsoryobservation attIibutro to Deputy Mikhail Poltoral)in that Yeltsin
and his entoUrage could 'sort outNfV in an hour or 50/ 'Yeltsin Issues Decree Reorganising State
Broadcasting Companies,' BBC Summary ofWorld BroadC4Sls, 20 October 1995.
36 1992 MassMetlia law, Article 36.
37 Ibid. Articles 4D-42, 47.
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of television is far from the shaping of political forces in the post-Soviet
world.
The pressure - certainly that from outside Russia - is toward the
rembvii! of major issues concemingthe architecture from the daily
problems of the direct political process. The building of a rule of law in
media policy - and one that respects and fosters free speech principles,
might be a goal which defies current Russian reality. Without a firm
independent legal authority, particuIarlf'ih the realm of· broadcaslfug,
policy is inherently pollticised, providing little predictability.
The se~~md point is financing: there is the hope. for an independent
Russian press at a timewhen the advertising market and other forms of
support (such as subscription) are· inadequate to maintain all of the
existing participants. OwnerShip policies cannot be divorced from the
question of financing - if financial support were to continue to come
from the state budget, as it does now even for s<H:alled 'public'
broadcasting, it is difficult to foresee how an independent body could be
established and maintained.
. .
. Finally,there is the possibilitY that,,·tbe,Russiait.• judiciary. might
incrementally develop a body of principles for resolution of ownership
issues. Of great interest will be the development of the Russian
Constitutional Court. Whether it will follow the lead of its Inodel, the
Gennan Constitutional Court, (which also~stepped.in·to playa-leading"
role in broadcasting, despite a highly charged political38 debate) is yet to
be seen. .
fu. the end, it is· simply premature to talk of the development of
substantive. legal mass media. ownership policy. The fonnulation of
.policy in this sense - as a body ofprinciples taking shape incrementally
through a series of small steps--:-, will await in Russia the prerequisi~s
for such development: the matut41g 'ofmstittitloris and processes Whidl' '
can shape such policies. In the meantime, policy and politics concerning
ownership and control of the media will remain inextricably intertwined.
38 Eric Barendt The Influence of the Cecman and Italian Constitutional Coum on Their National
Broadcasting SystelIlS', 1991 Public LAw, 93, 95--105 (discussing.also.therole oUribunalsinJtaly, .
SPain. the Uni.ro States, and France~
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